Sorry if I haven't been giving that impression lately - I've been trying to direct my writing time toward other projects over the last few days, and the Wall has been denied its regular messages of outrage and despair.
Anyway, the things I'd like to bring to your attention today are these:
First, and probably most important, is a
new article in the
New York Times; though there are some that want Americans to believe that Iran is just a step away from being able to build nuclear warheads in
sixteen day jags, most experts seem to believe that that's years away. Keeping the current cascade going is going to be a technical challenge for the Iranians, and launching thousands of new reactors - given limited resources - isn't really a near-term concern.
Over in the comments section of a Democracy Arsenal piece on the distinctions between the current Iranian tensions and the Cuban missile crisis, a gentleman named Dan Kervick
had the following to say:
Eevn [sic] if Iran should develop a limited nuclear force in five years time, they are nowhere remotely near developing the kind of force that would give them a winnable first strike capability. And they are not at this time part of a larger enemy nuclear bloc that could defend them. So, if Iran develops a nuclear weapon, we only need to state very clearly to them that any nuclear missile assault on Isreal - or on the United States via terrorist proxies - would be met with an overwhelming retaliatory nuclear response from the US. That response is very credible, and should be sufficient to deter Iran.
The argument that this sort of deterrance would not work is based on the caricature of the "Mad Mullahs" - the notion that Iran is run by a cult of deranged suicide bombers who would comdemn their entire country to nuclear doom if that were the cost of launching a single glancing blow against the Great Satan. I think this perception of the Iranian state is far-fetched, to say the least.
The "slow motion" aspect of this problem is also very relevant here. These alleged Iranian threats are still a long way off, according to the experts. Iran sends frequent signals that it is looking for a grand deal on regional security issues; and making such a deal would probably be in our interest. We don't face a pressing crisis in which Iranians are about arm an arsenal of nuclear weapons and deploy them. There is ample time for pre-emption later, even if it should ever be required.
There's more to his response, and it's worth reading - particularly the bits about Russia's role in the next few cycles of diplomacy - but I think this bit suffices to underline the lack of a need for panic.
William Arkin is
arguing that, in fact, there probably is no panic - that contingency plans are being updated, but that there isn't much evidence of serious preparatory work for military incursions being done, and that the articles being written these days are light on specifics for exactly that reason. Alas, he then decides that he's being just a bit
too reassuring, and that realism demands he toss in a caveat.
A war with Iran started purposefully or by accident, will be a mess. What is happening now though is not just an administration prudently preparing for the unfortunate against an aggressive and crazed state, it is also aggressive and crazed, driven by groupthink and a closed circle of bears.
The public needs to know first, that this planning includes preemptive plans that the President could approve and implement with 12 hours notice. Congress should take notice of the fact that there is a real war plan -- CONPLAN 8022 -- and it could be implemented tomorrow.
Second, the public needs to know that the train has left the station on bigger war planning, that a ground war -- despite the Post claim yesterday that a land invasion "is not contemplated" -- is also being prepared. It is a real war plan; I've heard CONPLAN 1025.
Great.
There are a couple of explanations for this flood of Iran-attack chatter out in prominent places (and thanks go to Laura Rozen for providing links and extended quotes). The
Times has run an article suggesting that the Bush administration is playing
a bit of a spin game - not just for the benefit of the Iranians, but also for their traditional diplomatic allies.
"Is it a good thing for the Iranians to think there are occasions where the U.S. would use force? Sure," said Eliot A. Cohen, a professor at Johns Hopkins University who directed the Air Force's definitive study of the first war against Iraq. "But I don't get a sense that people in the administration are champing at the bit to launch another war in the Persian Gulf."
Others suggest that the vague drumbeat of talk about military action may be less aimed at Tehran than at China and Russia — two countries that have said they oppose even the threat of economic sanctions against Iran, much less threats to set back the Iranian program by obliterating its facilities.
"In Tehran, the threat of military action is double-edged," said Ashton B. Carter, a Harvard security expert who worked on nuclear issues in the Clinton administration. "It may scare the leadership, but it could also cause people to rally around the leadership. Where it's most effective is showing the Russians and the Chinese that we are serious about stopping this program."
The question is how serious, and on that question the administration seems happy to create a strategic fog. Officials at the Pentagon say military planners are examining and updating a variety of contingencies for possible military action against Iran. But they quickly add that such updates are routine.
Chris Nelson, of the Nelson Report, thinks there's another level to it:
Every paper and magazine of national stature has pieces with increasingly anxious quotes from past and present US officials, increasingly frank about their fears for the future.
Step back, and think about what we are really hearing from the US intelligence and military community: on one level, sure, there is a big psy-war operation being conducted by both Washington and Teheran (see today’s Washington Post) as each seeks to influence the sanctions debate at the United Nations, and whatever comes next.
But if you look at the pattern of stories in recent weeks, examine the details of both anonymous and on-the-record quotes, you see that there’s another game underway, and our sources say it’s called “pre-empting Bush” by laying out contingency plans, including the most bizarre, such as using tactical nuclear weapons on the Natanz reactor complex.
The rising drum beat of revelations, our sources argue, can have only one serious meaning: US military leaders want to force a public debate which makes it difficult for the President to talk himself into ordering a military solution to Iran’s nuclear ambitions. [...]
What terrifies serious US military, intelligence, and diplomatic players is how this Administration can turn a tactical military victory into strategic catastrophe.
Hit Natanz...then what? That’s the big question our sources are asking. After any US air strikes, does Iran meekly fold its nuclear tent and bow to the all-mighty will of George Bush? Or does Iran escalate its intervention in Iraq against US troops and interests...then Jordan...then Turkey...and, always, Israel...not to mention the Asian and European oil lifelines in the Gulf?
I've got no direct link - I'm not cool enough to be a Nelson recipient - but Ms. Rozen was kind enough to
toss it up.
There's no internal inconsistency in the idea that outside experts might overreact to an administration psy-op/diplomatic positioning gambit, of course, but my own feeling is that Seymour Hersh is
very unlikely to have been completely played, given his considerable experience - and, anyway, the administration does have a history of making geopolitical calls that can best be described as "barking mad."
Meanwhile, Andrew Sullivan has reminded me that James Fallows and the
Atlantic pulled together a group of experts and gamed out potential American-Iranian confrontations back in 2004, as a
bleak kind of thought experiment. A big hunk of the concluding page follows.
About Iran's intentions there is no disagreement. Iran is trying to develop nuclear weapons, and unless its policy is changed by the incentives it is offered or the warnings it receives, it will succeed.
About America's military options there is almost as clear a view. In circumstances of all-out war the United States could mount an invasion of Iran if it had to. If sufficiently provoked—by evidence that Iran was involved in a terrorist incident, for example, or that it was fomenting violence in Iraq—the United States could probably be effective with a punitive bomb-and-missile attack on Revolutionary Guard units.
But for the purposes most likely to interest the next American President—that is, as a tool to slow or stop Iran's progress toward nuclear weaponry—the available military options are likely to fail in the long term. A full-scale "regime change" operation has both obvious and hidden risks. The obvious ones are that the United States lacks enough manpower and equipment to take on Iran while still tied down in Iraq, and that domestic and international objections would be enormous. The most important hidden problem, exposed in the war-game discussions, was that a full assault would require such drawn-out preparations that the Iranian government would know months in advance what was coming. Its leaders would have every incentive to strike pre-emptively in their own defense. Unlike Saddam Hussein's Iraq, a threatened Iran would have many ways to harm America and its interests. Apart from cross-border disruptions in Iraq, it might form an outright alliance with al-Qaeda to support major new attacks within the United States. It could work with other oil producers to punish America economically. It could, as Hammes warned, apply the logic of "asymmetric," or "fourth-generation," warfare, in which a superficially weak adversary avoids a direct challenge to U.S. military power and instead strikes the most vulnerable points in American civilian society, as al-Qaeda did on 9/11. If it thought that the U.S. goal was to install a wholly new regime rather than to change the current regime's behavior, it would have no incentive for restraint.
What about a pre-emptive strike of our own, like the Osirak raid? The problem is that Iran's nuclear program is now much more advanced than Iraq's was at the time of the raid. Already the U.S. government has no way of knowing exactly how many sites Iran has, or how many it would be able to destroy, or how much time it would buy in doing so. Worse, it would have no way of predicting the long-term strategic impact of such a strike. A strike might delay by three years Iran's attainment of its goal—but at the cost of further embittering the regime and its people. Iran's intentions when it did get the bomb would be all the more hostile.
Here the United States faces what the military refers to as a "branches and sequels" decision—that is, an assessment of best and second-best outcomes. It would prefer that Iran never obtain nuclear weapons. But if Iran does, America would like Iran to see itself more or less as India does—as a regional power whose nuclear status symbolizes its strength relative to regional rivals, but whose very attainment of this position makes it more committed to defending the status quo. The United States would prefer, of course, that Iran not reach a new level of power with a vendetta against America. One of our panelists thought that a strike would help the United States, simply by buying time. The rest disagreed. Iran would rebuild after a strike, and from that point on it would be much more reluctant to be talked or bargained out of pursuing its goals—and it would have far more reason, once armed, to use nuclear weapons to America's detriment.
Just for the record.