Today's
New York Times features a couple of big-picture articles about Iraq (following up on yesterday's revelations in the
Post about our long, slow
stalemate/defeat in Anbar) - the
first covers a memo from Stephen Hadley, Mr. Bush's national security advisor, which makes the rather obvious point that Iraqi PM Nouri al-Maliki may not be doing his job to our specifications.
[As an aside, timing is everything: Mr. Bush is gearing up for a meeting with Mr. Maliki later today. The memo leak, along with the
Post article signaling Mr. Bush's frustration with the state of affairs in Mr. Maliki's government, should probably be taken as a sign that we're not going to let the Sadrists (who, of course, threatened to bring down Iraq's governing coalition over this meeting) play hardball alone. Or, hell, maybe it's just calculated petulance - the president seems to be in
kind of a mood these days.]
The
second Times article is a broader piece of analysis: the short version is that Iraq functionally has no political center, the government is ineffective and flying apart, and Muqtada al-Sadr has everyone over a barrel. For the long version, follow the link itself - the thing is worth reading in its entirety.
Me, though, I'm just introducing it for contrast. What I really want to talk about comes from
yesterday's edition:
an article wherein President Bush talks about what's going on and why.
“There’s all kinds of speculation about what may or may not be happening,” Mr. Bush said in Estonia, with that country’s president, Toomas Hendrik Ilves, by his side. He added, “No question about it, it’s tough.”
Saying he blamed Al Qaeda for the increased violence, Mr. Bush referred to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the Al Qaeda leader in Iraq who was killed by American forces over the summer. “The plan of Mr. Zarqawi was to foment sectarian violence,” he said.
Yes, indeed. And
Mr. Zarqawi was killed in June.
Obviously, al-Qaeda
is active in Iraq - not least in Anbar - but foreign fighters are hardly the primary cause of violence in Baghdad, let alone the fragility of the state's governing entity. Every other article I've linked to above explains as much, and generally sources members of the Bush administration to do it. If Sunni violence had been strangled down by early 2004 - or, hell, if the Iraqi Army had been maintained in the first place - it's possible that Muqtada al-Sadr's dreams of warlordism might've been contained, but these days it's the Shi'ite extremists who are presenting the most complicated security problems. Even if the common Shi'ites on the street felt safe enough to back away from them - if the Sunnis, native and foreign, were pacified - the Mahdi gang would still run the hospitals, the universities, and altogether too much of the infrastructure of the nation.
So I'm wondering why Mr. Bush said what he said, and the most obvious answers are grotesque cynicism - associating violence with al-Qaeda allows him to tap into whatever lingering glow of legitimacy he had on September 12, 2001 - or a degree of personal confusion on his part that
just isn't appropriate for a man in his office.
Neither of those explanations offers much evidence to support any great hopes of introspection or healthy change from the White House, obviously. We're looking at another occasion Mr. Bush is failing to rise to meet.