So, I made the mistake of reading the
Washington Post's editorial page again this morning, and found that the piece that took up the prime real estate at the top of the page - "
The Results of Diplomacy (In Iran's case, they've been pretty thin.)" - was kinda problematic. Misleading, even. Not as bad as some, sure; it doesn't go that extra mile and overtly recommend any wildly stupid courses of action. But it seems to be chiding the Bush administration for its naiveté in trusting in the power of diplomacy against the Iranian menace, and . . . well, hell, read it for yourself.
Here's the whole thing:
IRAN'S SEIZURE of 15 British sailors and marines on the day before the U.N. Security Council approved another resolution imposing sanctions on Tehran for its nuclear program may have been a coincidence. But the seizure illustrated a stubborn reality about the diplomatic campaign the Bush administration embraced two years ago: While successful on its own terms, the campaign has yet to produce any significant change in Iranian behavior.
Administration officials were encouraged by signs of dissension in the Iranian leadership after the first of two unanimous sanctions resolutions passed the Security Council in late December. Before the second resolution was introduced, there were talks between Iranian and European officials about ways to renew negotiations. Yet the Iranian work on uranium enrichment has continued; there are signs the regime is racing to complete an industrial installation with thousands of centrifuges that it can present to the world as an accomplished fact.
Now Iran is parading captured British sailors before cameras and using their purported confessions of trespassing in Iranian waters as propaganda in a way that suggests an eagerness to escalate rather than defuse confrontation with the West. Yesterday, Britain offered evidence that its service members were captured in international waters and rightly called their treatment "completely unacceptable." Though Iran's foreign minister said a female sailor would be released "very soon," the television broadcast suggested the prisoners had been coerced.
It's widely believed that power in Iran is divided among competing factions, and it could be that hard-liners are seeking to preempt any steps by the regime to comply with the Security Council. It's impossible to predict what might come out of Tehran before the next U.N. deadline in late May. Yet what has happened so far is sobering.
Bush administration officials have been congratulating themselves on the relative speed and deftness with which the latest sanctions resolution was pushed through the Security Council. They are right, in a way: The diplomatic campaign against Iran has been pretty successful by the usual diplomatic measures. Not only has the United States worked relatively smoothly with European partners with which it differed bitterly over Iraq, but it has also been effective lately in winning support from Russia, China and nonaligned states such as South Africa.
Critics who lambasted the administration's unilateral campaign against an "axis of evil" a few years ago ought to be applauding the return to conventional diplomacy. We, too, think it's worth pursuing, especially when combined with steps short of a military attack to push back against Iranian aggression in the region. Still, two years after President Bush embraced the effort, it has to be noted: The diplomatic strategy so far has been no more successful than the previous "regime change" policy in stopping Iran's drive for a nuclear weapon.
Now, it seems to me that the assessment of the current situation isn't too far off. The scene's tense. The scene sucks, in fact. The Revolutionary Guard grabbed fifteen Brits -
probably in Iraqi waters, not that it would've been a justified step even had there been an accidental crossing into Iranian territory - and has presumably made sure to keep them in the hands of people who want to ratchet up tensions with the West for political gain. Specifically, one might guess, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's political gain. Still, we don't know who exactly has them, and so we don't know the ideal proportion of carrot to stick.
Given that, "conventional diplomacy" plus "steps short of a military attack" does indeed make sense. I mean, inasmuch as anything so vague can.
But the editorial goes beyond the quick description and the nebulous prescription; it's trying to sell us the idea that the Bush administration has pushed pure diplomacy to its natural limits over the last two years, and gotten nowhere. This idea is, to be charitable, a sign of some kind of problem found somewhere between sloppiness and derangement.
There's a whole journalistic industry devoted to the matter of American policy toward Iran in the post-Powell era, but the basic lines of it go: Condoleezza Rice and the Department of State want to pursue diplomacy, and Dick Cheney and his allies want to do their damnedest to sabotage any efforts toward same. Even when Ms. Rice is having a good week, there are
limits to what she can bring to the bargaining table, and all kinds of background chatter to undermine her message. If you look at the
state of diplomatic play in March, 2005 - the period the
Post singles out as the start of the talk-talk push - you'll note that that's the very same month the Cheneyites got John Bolton, professional anti-diplomat and known advocate of unilateral nuclear weapon deployment, in the UN. In December of that year, the
American Prospect ran
an article sketching out the awfulness of Mr. Bolton's tenure to date, with a long section devoted to his battles against Ms. Rice's policies:
In announcing the president’s nomination of Bolton, then the undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, Secretary Rice donned a happy face. Despite her enthusiastic exterior, though, this moment would mark the start of a new phase in their rocky relationship -- one in which Rice shadowed the heavy-handed Bolton with her own lighter diplomatic touch.
Indeed, it was Rice, not Bolton, who achieved the one significant success of Bolton’s first 100 days at the United Nations: a unanimous October 30 Security Council vote requiring Syria to fully cooperate with a UN investigation into the suspected Syria-sponsored assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. The Prospect has learned that in the days and weeks leading up to the late October UN report on Hariri’s assassination, Rice sought to sideline Bolton from the negotiations over the Security Council resolution that the report inspired. She also made the State Department, not the U.S. Mission to the UN, the central address for discussions on the resolution.
One of the first signs that a bureaucratic battle was brewing between Bolton and Rice over Syria came on October 18, when the State Department press corps was shocked to find that Rice had unexpectedly flown to New York to meet Annan. A State Department spokesman explained that the two met to “compare notes” in advance of a widely anticipated report by Detlev Mehlis, the secretary-general’s special investigator for the Hariri assassination. Yet Bolton, the man in charge of the United States’ day-to-day operations at the UN, was conspicuously absent from that meeting. In what appears to have been less of an accident than a matter of intentional timing, Rice made her trip to New York on the very morning that Bolton had to be in Washington, testifying before the Senate on the progress (or lack thereof) of UN reforms.
The Prospect has further learned that, rather than forging Security Council strategy with America’s European allies at the UN building in New York, much of the diplomatic legwork has been carried out in Foggy Bottom. On October 22, a French delegation from the UN traveled to Washington for initial discussions on the Syria resolution (later called Security Council Resolution 1636), of which the French were the original authors. According to a diplomatic source, Bolton was not initially invited to that meeting. The French, however, insisted on his presence. So Bolton attended, but not without three chaperones: Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs David Welch, Welch’s deputy (and vice-presidential daughter) Elizabeth Cheney, and National Security Council Middle East chief Michael Doran. “It’s like they stuck a strong team from the [State Department and National Security Council] to watch him,” said the diplomat.
Despite Rice’s tight oversight of the resolution negotiations, the unanimity of the council was still in doubt one day before the Security Council meeting. Finally, in a last-minute lunch meeting with her foreign-minister counterparts from the veto-wielding permanent five Security Council members, Rice personally removed references to sanctions that had been inserted by the United States. With those obstacles to unanimous consent gone, Resolution 1636 passed 15 to 0.
Rice’s involvement came after Bolton had won round one in the Syria battle. Bolton and Rice’s bureaucratic tiffs over Syria had actually boiled over two weeks prior to the Security Council vote. Journalist Ibrahim Hamidi, writing in the Arabic-language newspaper Al-Hayat, reported -- and the Prospect has independently confirmed -- that Bolton had leaked to British newspapers that the Bush administration had signaled its willingness to offer Syria a “Libya-style deal” -- a reference to Libyan President Muammar Quaddafi’s decision last year to give up pursuing weapons of mass destruction and renounce terrorism in return for a restoration of relations with the United States and the United Kingdom. According to The Times of London, Syria responded positively to the secret U.S. offer, which was made through a third party. But after Bolton publicly aired the details of the potential deal -- which would require Syria to cooperate with the Mehlis investigation, end interference in Lebanese affairs and alleged interference in Iraqi affairs, and cease supporting militant groups like Hamas and Hezbollah—Damascus quickly denied that such a deal was in the offing.
“It is no secret that Mr. Bolton and Dr. Rice are not the closest friends,” a well-placed UN official told the Prospect. “Indeed, I’ve heard it said that the main reason he came here was that she didn’t want him in Foggy Bottom.” The animosity between the two is, in fact, well established, as they locked horns on Iran. On April 18, 2005, The Washington Post reported that Bolton let Rice go on her first trip to Europe as secretary of state without briefing her on European opposition to his one-man campaign to seek the ouster of the International Atomic Energy Agency Chief Mohammed ElBaradei. ElBaradei was a popular diplomat -- and would later win the Nobel Peace Prize for his work -- but Bolton thought ElBaradei was too “soft” on Iran.
Rice was playing hardball with Bolton, too. During the first Bush term, Bolton had effectively blocked U.S. support for a French, German, and British plan for confronting Tehran’s nuclear ambitions. Soon after Rice moved to Foggy Bottom, she sought to keep Bolton out of key policy discussions about Iran. In June, The Washington Post reported that Rice sought to keep secret from Bolton a meeting of French, British, German, and American officials who flew to Washington for a “brainstorming session on Iran.” Of the Iran meeting a European diplomat told the Post, “It was the American side that didn’t want him there.”
That's not the end-all, be-all of American diplomatic schizophrenia, of course. There's a short timeline
here, care of the BBC - there's not a whole lot of meat to it, granted, but you can still get the sense of the environment against which diplomatic efforts were being made. From August 2005 on, there were recurring signs that Mr. Bush and his administration were more inclined toward military strikes than compromise, and Mr. Ahmadinejad - who'd been elected as an economic populist, remember - merrily took any pretext we offered to get in front of a microphone and show off his rabid, nihilistic side. How much diplomatic leverage do we suppose Ms. Rice was capable of exercising when there was some new story every month to suggest that she wasn't dealing in good faith, or, at least, couldn't guarantee that her negotiations would be accepted by the president and by those aides to the president who were assembling questionable care packages for the media about Iranian weapons being deployed against American troops?
Look, if Mr. Ahmadinejad is hell-bent on a confrontation, and has enough political capital in the Iranian system to keep his ass covered, then there's not a whole hell of a lot we can do. The kidnapping of the British sailors really is a dangerous provocation, and it's all on the heads of whatever faction those lunatics in the Iranian Revolutionary Guard found themselves representing. It may be that we're going somewhere even darker than where we already are.
Fine.
But, please,
please, let's not give political cover to all the people who've been pushing for hyper-aggressive foreign policy by pretending that the peaceniks have had free rein up `til now. Not least because it's inaccurate, and newspapers should care about that kind of thing.